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This paper investigates the sources of growth in agricultural value-added (GDP) and rural 
household incomes using a sample of developing countries.   The main  factors are: (i) 
providing macroeconomic and political stability; (ii) institutions establishing property rights 
and incentives; (iii) access to competitive input markets and remunerative output markets; 
and (iv) adoption of productivity-enhancing technology, and (v) real income growth in the 
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We can be most helpful in locating the bottlenecks and constraints to 
growth and suggest means to their alleviation.  In this, we sometimes 
have to operate at the frontier of professional knowledge, and often 
against the common wisdom of governments, but this is where the 




My aim is to follow Yair Mundlak’s recommendation in concluding his Elmhirst Lecture 
to identify sources of and constraints upon economic growth in agriculture.  I come to the 
subject not as a long-time researcher on international agricultural development, but rather 
to follow up studies of the development of U.S. agriculture.  The story of U.S. agriculture 
led me, as many before, to consider possible lessons for countries where sustained growth 
in the real incomes of rural people has not yet occurred.  Moreover, my U.S. research led 
into questions of how the relatively poorest farm people have fared in the growth process 
(Gardner, 2000), a topic which fits well with the emphasis of President von Braun’s 
address.   
 
I begin by revisiting some issues in agricultural development economics and data 
measurement.  In the second major section, empirical evidence is reviewed on the growth 
of agriculture as an industry.  The third section turns to welfare consequences of 
agricultural growth as measured by real household incomes.  The final section attempts to 
summarize our knowledge of the causes of sector growth and real income growth. 
 
Models of Growth 
 
Since World War II, a huge literature has emerged on economic growth with special 
attention to agriculture.  Since that time most of the poor countries of the world have 
become less poor, and agriculture in practically all of them has become more productive 
(in terms of output per worker, output per acre, or multifactor productivity growth).  But 
the success has varied widely from country to country, from one time period to another, 
and across regions within countries.  How well does the accumulated literature enable us 
to understand these variations, and what might have been done improve the performance 
of the worst-performing countries?  The central analytical task is to identify the causes of 
growth. 
 
                                                 
* Elmhirst Lecture at the 25
th Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists, 
August 17, 2003, Durban, South Africa.   For their comments on earlier drafts and in discussions of this 
topic I would like to thank, without implicating, Julian Alston, Chris Barrett, Uma Lele, Erik Lichtenberg, 
Marc Nerlove, Isabelle Tsakok, Alberto Valdés, and Joachim von Braun.   2
One might have expected the most helpful writings to be those which cover the 
complexity and range of the societies being studied, and thus finding a multiplicity of 
causes, each having different weights in different countries and at different times.  But to 
date no such comprehensive approach has proven fruitful.  Instead, economists’ 
contributions have typically proceeded by over-simplification, either by a model fixing 
on only a few key causal factors, which are taken to be applicable over a range of 
countries and circumstances, or by focusing on a single country and dissecting events 
through analytical description (as opposed to econometric hypothesis testing). 
 
Many of the key conceptual contributions can be classified according to two polarities of 
approach: microeconomic versus macroeconomic, and theoretical versus empirical.  No 
economist is purely in any of the four camps that these polarities generate – micro-
theoretical, micro-empirical, macro-theoretical, and macro-empirical.  But many have 
emphases that place their main contributions in one or another area.  The macro-
theoretical approach got a big initial boost in the 1950s from growth models treating 
output in the economy as generated by a neoclassical production function, with capital as 
an input created by savings.  Agriculture as a sector in a general equilibrium context was 
treated in two-sector models that in both comparative static versions (notably Simon 
1947) and the many dual economy models that followed.
1   
 
Macro-empirical contributions until recent years have had a case-study flavor, 
accumulating analytical description without a formal model.  Mancur Olson (1982) is a 
good example.  More recently the creation of panel data covering countries over time has 
made possible econometric macro-empirical research, e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995).  This literature has austere but fruitful theoretical underpinnings, leading to ideas 
of “convergence” that have not yet been exploited sufficiently in investigating 
agricultural growth.  An outstanding example of the micro-empirical approach is T.W. 
Schultz (1964).  Many recent papers on household behavior in poor countries are heavier 
on micro-theory.  But in Schultz and, for example Singh, Squire, and Strauss (1986), 
there is an intimate integration of theory and empirical observation.
2   
 
All the approaches have generated hypotheses about causes of growth that will be 
discussed below in the context of rural economic development. 
 
 Measures of Growth  
 
One of the services of models is to provide a conceptual basis for our choices of variables 
to measure in quantitative terms and test econometrically.  Agricultural output growth is a 
measure that arises naturally from estimation of a production function.  But output can 
grow for reasons that provide little or no support for a rising standard of living – for 
                                                 
1 “Comparative static” models investigate economic change through one-time shocks in exogenous 
variables, as opposed to dynamic models that investigate time paths of investment or other growth-
generating endogenous variables. 
2 Of course, many economists’ works don’t fall so easily into any of these categories.  Hayami and Ruttan 
(1985), Mundlak (1999), and Timmer (2002), for example, draw on all the approaches. 
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example output could rise under population pressure simply as a result of a larger farm 
labor force or clearing of additional land.  For many purposes a better indicator of growth 
is agricultural GDP (value added) per worker – what the sector generates for each 
productively engaged person over and above the cost of inputs from outside of 
agriculture.   Agricultural GDP per worker readily translates to a potential living-standard 
measure, namely real income per household.  With respect to causes of growth, 
underlying production theory says that either output or value added per worker can grow 
for the same two principal reasons: investment (including investment in human capital) 
and technological progress.  The question then becomes why investment and 
technological progress occur, or fail to. 
 
Matters get more interesting analytically as well as better attuned to actual situations 
when the link between agricultural value added and rural household incomes is broken.  
Farms produce non-agricultural products and farm household members earn incomes 
from nonfarm sources.  Then the causes of growth may well be different for agricultural 
growth and rural income growth.  Nonetheless, a flourishing agricultural sector can still 
be important instrumentally as a means of achieving rural income growth. One of the key 
empirical questions about economic growth in rural areas is how crucial agricultural 
sector growth is in the process.  
 
While measures of both agricultural sector growth and rural income growth are spotty in 
availability and questionable in quality, some useful indicators exist for many countries 
over a substantial period of time.  A promising way to learn about causes of growth is to 
compare the record of such indicators across countries as associated with variables 
hypothesized to be causes of growth.  In order to carry out such comparisons 
meaningfully, uniformly constructed cross-country data are needed.  The massive 
undertaking of constructing such a data set for agriculture has been taken on principally 
by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).  The World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (available on-line) combines the FAO data with 
other sectoral and macroeconomic information for the years 1961-2001.  These data are 
the main source of statistical information in this paper.  Measures of agricultural sector 
growth include cereal yields, crop and livestock output indexes, and agriculture’s 
contribution to GDP (sectoral value added). 
  
Agricultural Sector Growth 
 
“Getting agriculture moving” is a slogan that encapsulates the problem as it has appeared 
to agricultural economists early in the post-World War II period as population pressures 
were seen as requiring faster expansion of food production than looked likely to occur in 
many low-income countries, where traditional agriculture is the rule.  Traditional 
agriculture is characterized by poverty or subsistence-level living standards, with famine 
an ever-present threat, and hope of transformation to a higher standard of living for the 
rural population as a whole remote.  What has to happen for a country’s agriculture to 
break out of that situation?  In the early 1960s, T.W. Schultz formulated his answer, 
beginning with what is NOT likely to work: improved efficiency within existing resource 
and technological constraints is not the answer, nor is investing more, given those   4
constraints.  Clearing more land is an investment that tends to be too costly for the returns 
to generate sustained growth and “additional irrigation is on approximately the same 
footing as land” (Schultz, 1965, p. 45).  The high-payoff sources of growth are to be 
found elsewhere, notably in “improvements in the quality of agricultural inputs,” 
virtually all of which must come from outside of agriculture rather than being generated 
within it (p. 46).  Here Schultz has in mind not only fertilizer, tractors, and improved crop 
genetics, but also schooling and other means to improve the skills of farm people.
3 
 
The thinking of all who take an interest in agricultural development has to be influenced 
by the high returns to agricultural research in many countries, notably in the “Green 
Revolution.”  We have inspiring cases where agriculture has flourished as a result.  What 
is the evidence of success from these developments?  Three indicators are: cereal yields, 
multifactor productivity, and agricultural GDP per worker.
4  Acceleration in yield is an 
indicator that a technology/investment shock is generating streams of output from given 
land inputs; but it is partial in that yield increases themselves do not imply improved 
economic returns because the land-augmenting inputs may cost too much.  Multifactor 
productivity takes into account all the measured inputs and so is conceptually a far better 
indicator of what a country obtains from a given set of resources committed to 
agriculture.  But despite recent progress, obtaining accurate cross-country comparisons of 
many inputs and hence of multifactor productivity over time remains a major problem; 
and anyway multifactor productivity is not a sufficient indicator of the returns to farm-
origin land, labor, and invested capital that constitute the basis for farm household 
income growth (because, for example, product buyers may reap the bulk of productivity 
gains through lower product prices).  Agricultural GDP subtracts out the costs of 
purchased inputs from outside agriculture, and indicates the net gains available for 
purposes of improved incomes of farm people.  But the data are sparser and require often-
dubious assumptions (for example in estimating capital service flows) for multifactor 




Table 1 provides data on growth rates of cereal yields (kilograms per hectare) for 85 
countries during two time periods, 1961-80 and 1981-2001.
5  The two periods are 
referred to as “Early Green Revolution” and “Late Green Revolution” by Evenson and 
Gollin (2003).  The yield data are instructive in showing that progress indeed has 
occurred worldwide.  Yields increased during 1961-2001 in all but 9 of the 85 countries 
covered; 8 of these were in Sub-Saharan Africa (Angola, Botswana, Chad, Congo, 
                                                 
3 But education is expected to be productive by improving the basic skills of people, not by changing their 
outlook to be less traditional or via other cultural changes.  Indeed, Timmer attributes to Schultz “the 
demise in the late 1960s of community-action programs,” which focused on cultural/institutional 
transformation (Timmer, 2002, p. 1516). 
4 For purposes of evaluating investments in research that generate technological change, a more appropriate 
bottom line is the rate of return to that investment.  It is estimates of these rates being extraordinarily high 
that have sealed the case for the benefits of international agricultural research.  (See Alston et al., 2000 and 
Evenson 2001 for comprehensive reviews.) 
5 The rates are calculated from linear trend regressions on the log of yield (so as not to be unduly influenced 
by the end-points of the periods chosen).   5
Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan).  The sub-periods show a slowdown in yield 
growth in recent years, a phenomenon that some have viewed with alarm (see for 
example, International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2001, Ch. 4).  However, the 
slowdown is not huge, and does not occur in many countries.  Yields in 15 of the 31 Sub-
Saharan African countries of Table 1, and in 10 of 18 Latin American ones, grew faster in 
1981-2001 than in 1961-80.  The countries that fit best the notion of yield slowdown 
were the industrial country (OECD) group.
6 
 
Table 1 ranks countries within each regional group by the rate of yield growth in 1961-
81.  It is notable that countries with the highest yield growth in 1961-81 are typically 
observed to have slower yield growth in 1981-2001, while the departures from this 
generalization tended to be countries with lower growth rates in 1961-80.  However, the 
correlation coefficient between the growth rates in the earlier and later periods is only 
-.06, not statistically significant, for the whole sample of 85 countries.  Figure 1 shows 
the time series of yield growth for countries that had particularly high or low rates in 
1961-80.  China and India are examples where yields grew at a high rate and then 
continued to do so; while yields in Belize and Swaziland grew at a high rate and then 
stagnated.  In Angola and Mozambique yields declined sharply and then rebounded.  
There are no cases where yields declined at a high rate and then continued to decline. The 
closest approximation is Haiti where a 0.4 percent rate of yield decline in 1961-81 was 
followed by a 0.7 percent rate of decline in 1980-2001. 
 
Figure 1 indicates a substantial divergence of yields over time.  This is partly a matter of 
the small sample selected, but a figure that includes all the 85 countries covered (not 
shown) also exhibits divergence of yields over time.  This divergence of yields across 
countries is a surprise from the viewpoint that underlies a lot of recent work in the theory 
of economic growth.   The basic idea is that any economy’s output is generated by 
technology and economic actors following neoclassical principles.  The application to 
crop yields is that with the same technology available everywhere, countries with lower 
yields will have a higher marginal return to additional inputs under neoclassical 
production.  Therefore use of such inputs is expected to increase at a higher rate in lower-
yield countries and to increase their yields faster than those of initially high-yield 
countries.  So stated, this idea is unattractive for the historical evolution of most of world 
agriculture because of differences in climate and other natural resources and because the 
same technology is not in use everywhere.   
                                                 
6 The World Bank (2002) states that “the yield growth experienced since the 1970s has slowed sharply in 
the 1990s due to diminishing returns to further input use, the rising cost of expanding irrigation, a 
slowdown in investment in infrastructure and research (in part induced by declining commodity prices), 
and resource and environmental constraints” (p. 47).  This story is generally plausible but not supported 
with evidence, and what seems most fundamentally dubious is the initial claim of a sharp slowdown in 
yield growth.  Of the 31 Sub-Saharan African countries of Table 1, in 16 yields increased more rapidly in 
the 1990s as compared to the 1980s than in the 1980s compared to the 1970s; and similarly the trend rate of 
growth during the 1990s was greater than the trend rate during 1970-89 for 16 of the 31 (different 
comparisons than shown in Table 1 but with generally the same story).  The 11 Asian countries in the 
sample are similarly split.  But China and India, the two biggest, do conform to the idea of a yield 
slowdown in the 1990s.  While these large countries dominate the worldwide picture, we have about as 
many countries where yields accelerated in the 1990s as where yields decelerated.   6
 
The issue then arises of the international transfer of technology.  On this subject we do 
have plausible dating of at least one important element of the cross-country story: the 
international integration of agricultural research under the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) in about 1970.  We can hypothesize that, if 
agricultural research is an important element of the story, we ought to see more 
convergence in years following 1970 than before.  A more complex version of this story 
is what Evenson and Gollin call “broader and deeper impacts” of CGIAR research on 
more crops in more countries after the mid-1970s (2003, p. 758).  Yet the yield data of 
Table 1 give no indications of yield convergence, even in the 1990s. 
 
Agricultural GDP per Worker 
 
The convergence hypothesis might be more likely to apply to real agricultural GDP per 
worker. The idea is that, at an initial point in time, countries with a lower agricultural 
GDP per worker will have a higher marginal return to capital investment under the 
classical laws of production.  Therefore more investment will occur in lower-GDP 
countries and their agricultures will grow faster than those of initially high-GDP 
countries.  Notwithstanding questions of accurate measurement, the FAO/World Bank 
indicator series provide a substantial, consistently constructed panel of cross-country 
comparisons over time.  Table 2 shows the 1980-2001 growth rates of agricultural GDP 
per worker for the 79 countries that have sufficient data for this purpose.  These rates, as 
was also the case for the cereal yield growth rates discussed above, are not calculated 
from changes between the 1980 and 2001 endpoints on the grounds that random year-to-
year variation makes the calculated rate too sensitive to the choice of endpoint years (and 
for some countries the data available do not begin until after 1980 and end before 2001).  
Instead, log-linear trend regressions were estimated and the slope for each country is the 
“trend growth rate” for that country.  Time series for several groups of countries are 
shown in Figures 2a to 2d.  In none of these charts is convergence evident, nor is there 
convergence between groups.  The African countries started lowest and grew slowest, 
and the OECD countries started highest and grew fastest.  But there are substantial 
differences among the growth experiences of countries within each group and across all 
groups, and we may learn about the causes of growth by finding out which “growth 
conditioning variables” explain those differences. 
 
The importance of growth-conditioning variables became apparent to scholars of both 
agricultural and general economic growth as thwarted expectations of technology-led 
rural prosperity mounted.  T.W. Schultz noted that while advances in technology and 
availability of capital for financing new inputs had become ever more widespread, “it has 
become increasingly evident that adoption of the research contributions and efficient 
allocation of the additional capital are being seriously thwarted by the distortion of 
agricultural incentives” (Schultz, 1978, p. vii).  The World Bank (2002) summarizes a 
range of recent opinion about constraints to growth, noting the prevalence of problems 
created by micro and macro policy discrimination against agriculture, inefficient and 
uncompetitive marketing institutions, underdeveloped labor and financial markets, weak   7
political and property-right institutions, and world price-depressing policies of the OECD 
countries (p. 47). 
 
But which variables are the most important ones?  Are there some that do not matter 
much in fact even though in principle they might have been expected to?  Are there some 
conditions that are so important that, if they prevail, they are sufficient for real income 
growth?  Two quite different approaches to answering such questions are prominent.  The 
first is econometric, pooling data on similar variables for as many countries as possible 
and attempting to explain the differences in growth statistically through association with 
candidate causal variables.  The second is qualitative and narrative, essentially the 
accumulation of case studies by scholars with wide experience in agriculture across a 




Theory and Convergence.  An econometric approach that has immediate attraction as a 
method of explaining differences in growth rates among countries is to use time series 
regressions, pooled across countries, in which changes in candidate variables as causes of 
growth are correlated with rates of growth in real agricultural GDP per worker, or other 
variables taken as indicators of growth in agriculture.   Hayami and Ruttan (1985, Chaps. 
5, 6) and Mundlak (1999, 2000, 2001) have explored in depth the use of cross-country 
production functions.
7  Hayami and Ruttan explained an agricultural output index as a 
Cobb-Douglas function of inputs for 43 countries in 1960, 1970, and 1980, and used the 
results to account for growth in output per worker.  They found that output per worker in 
less-developed countries could effectively be increased by input increases along with 
education and research, and viewed the findings as “essentially encouraging” because 
they showed the possibility of progress even in the face of population pressure with 
limited agricultural land availability (p. 157).   
 
Mundlak worked with improved data, especially for capital and investment, increased the 
country coverage to 88, extended the data coverage to 1992, explained agricultural GDP 
rather than output, and generalized the model to incorporate incentives (prices and risk) 
and constraints from the economic and physical environment as well as the usual input 
quantities.  He also used country-specific “within” as well as “between” time period 
estimators to minimize identification problems that plague cross-sectional production 
function estimates.
8  Mundlak found input quantities to be important largely as expected, 
largely in line with earlier findings, and found increases in capital especially important in 
generating increased agricultural GDP.  Variables over which a country can have some 
control as a matter of policy, notably agricultural prices and schooling, were estimated to 
have quite small effects (the schooling results in sharp contrast to Hayami and Ruttan).  
But, as Mundlak (2001) notes, these policy variables may influence investment and 
adoption of improved inputs, and the regressions already include the input levels.  To sort 
                                                 
7 Other recent studies similar in approach include Fulginiti and Perrin (1993), Frisvold and Ingram (1995), 
and Craig, Pardey and Roseboom (1997). For a summary of findings from earlier such studies, see Hayami 
and Ruttan (1985), p. 149. 
8 See Deaton (1995, pp. 1824-1827) for a succinct presentation of the problems and remedies.   8
out the full contributions of such variables as causes of growth one needs either a more 
complete structural model of input and output supply and demand, or else reduced-form 
equations in which growth is estimated as a function of exogenous or policy variables 
only. 
 
Attempts to test the convergence hypothesis, such as Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) have 
generated an essentially reduced-form approach that may be helpful.  The simplest 
deterministic equation for estimating convergence is: 
 
(1)                                          Gt,0  =  α + β y0 
where Gt,0 is the rate of growth of agricultural GDP per worker between time 0 and a later 
time, t, y0 is the log of the initial level of agricultural GDP per worker, and α and β are 
parameters to be estimated.  The estimate of β indicates the change in the growth rate 
resulting from a one percent higher level of y0.  Analogously, other initial-year levels of 
other variables hypothesized to influence growth can be added to equation (1).  What we 
give up with this simple approach is the capability to estimate the dynamics of growth – 
how changes in causal variables affect growth and its timing – and the capability to 
estimate structural parameters of production or supply relationships.  However, the 
econometric problems of sorting out causal effects from trending time series, and the 
predominance of measurement errors or other random fluctuations in year-to-year 
changes, are likely to preclude estimating dynamic relationships anyway.   
 
Econometric objections to equation (1) have been raised.
9 One is the likelihood of bias 
toward a negative value of the estimated β because initial measured levels are temporarily 
low or high just by chance, owing to measurement error or transitory single-year events. 
When this occurs we are liable to observe convergence according to equation (1) even if 
in fact no real convergence occurs.  This problem is may be intractable given likely 
measurement error as well as random fluctuation in the agricultural GDP data.  It means 
we cannot be confident of what is really measured by the estimated β. 
 
A second problem is that if variables omitted from the equation are positively 
(negatively) correlated with income growth but negatively correlated with initial income, 
the estimated β will be biased toward a negative (positive) value.  Or, in the variant 
discussed by Nerlove (2002, p. 330), the initial value of income will tend to be positively 
correlated with omitted variables promoting growth, and with persistence in the growth 
process these determinants will still be operating in the period over which convergence is 
tested, thus biasing the estimated β upward, tending to reject convergence.  To address 
this criticism, one can add initial-year variables for likely omitted variables to the 
equation, thus estimating “conditional” convergence.  This approach is what was 
suggested above, adding additional variables hypothesized to be causes of growth.  But 
some relevant variables are sure to be omitted, just because sufficient data are not 
available, so the criticism is in practice unavoidable.   
 
                                                 
9 For details, see Quah (1996) or Nerlove (2000, 2002). 
   9
The general form of the linear regressions to be estimated is : 
 
(2)                             Gt,0  =  α  +  β y0  +  γ X0  + δ ∆Zt,0  +  ε 
where X0  is a vector of initial values of hypothesized causal variables that may be 
endogenous, ∆Zt,0 is a vector of rates of change between 0 and t (changes in natural logs) 
of hypothesized causal variables that change over time and are exogenous to Gt,0, ε is an 
iid error term, and γ and δ are vectors of parameters that provide estimated impacts of the 
variables on growth.  The observations are of a cross section of countries (country 
subscripts on the variables and error term are suppressed). 
 
Explaining growth in the framework of equation (2) places the emphasis differently than 
in cross-country production function estimation.  The key variables in production 
functions are input quantities and, in the dynamic context, investment in capital.  But 
these are endogenous variables and not appropriate either as X0 or ∆Zt,0 variables in 
equation (2).  The use of equation (2) is rather to explore quantitatively the influence of 
factors that the literature on economic development has given attention to, typically in a 
descriptive or qualitative fashion.  For example, a nation’s rural infrastructure, human 
capital, market institutions, and political framework are aspects of the initial conditions 
that may be conducive or inimical to growth.  Policy changes, educational improvements 
or world market changes, if they are exogenous, are examples of possible ∆Zt,0 variables. 
 
Selection of Explanatory Variables.  Attempts to consider multiple routes to growth, and 
as a result of that consideration narrow the focus to key factors, typically take a case-
study, analytically  descriptive approach for one or a few countries rather than trying to 
systematically compare many countries in a cross-country regression.  Examples of 
thoughtful studies of this genre include Pearson et al. (1987), Lele (1989), and Eicher 
(1999), among many others.  While such studies have country-specific objectives, they 
can be helpful in specifying cross-sectional regressions because their findings for 
particular cases suggest hypotheses that can sometimes be tested in the cross-country 
context – the main constraint being whether reasonably believable data can be found to 
embody the hypothesis.   
 
It is striking in such case studies that the factors that end up being the focus of interest 
typically have a public-good or governmental focus.  The underlying reason is that the 
countries considered tend to be ones in which economic growth has been weak, as is the 
case in so much of developing country agriculture for most of recorded history.  If a 
country is mired in stagnation and poverty, one has to look for major changes or shocks 
to the system, and governments (albeit sometimes foreign governments) are the 
instruments at hand to provide public goods such as research or remove public bads such 
as monopoly, abuse of power, or legal disorganization.  Given that, one may be taken 
aback to read Mundlak’s admonition quoted at the beginning of this paper for economists 
to operate “against the common wisdom of governments.”  The problem is that 
governments are often the source of the problem, or are not willing or able to undertake 
the recommended policies.  After all, governments are not entities exogenous to the status 
quo that can be used to shock the economy, but are an integral part of the status quo.   10
 
Consider the following conditioning factors for agricultural GDP growth, in all of which 
government has some role: (i) providing macroeconomic and political stability; (ii) 
institutions establishing appropriate incentives; (iii) access to competitive input markets 
(including credit) and remunerative output markets; and (iv) fostering productivity-
enhancing new technology.  Notwithstanding the earlier econometric strictures against 
confidence in obtaining unbiased coefficients or standard errors, we can look for 
evidence of effects of such growth conditioning factors by introducing variables in 
equation (2) for initial-period values of variables intended to measure them.  Unless 
otherwise specified the data used come from the World Bank Development Indicators. 
 
(i) Stability:  Annual inflation rates are used to construct an indicator of macroeconomic 
instability, the variability (standard deviation) of the rate of inflation over the 1980-2001 
period.  Political stability is a more nebulous but arguably more important, especially in 
the dimension ranging from civil war to domestic peace (see for example Collier et al., 
2003).  I use a dummy variable equal to 1 for Colombia plus countries identified as 
internal war cases during 1980-2000 in Stuart, Huang, and Wang (2001).  
 
(ii) Incentive-friendly institutions:  A regime of confiscatory taxation or regulation, or 
absence of property rights, are widely seen as deadly to economic growth.   Indicators 
from O’Driscoll, Feulner, and O’Grady (2003), Transparency International (2002), and 
Freedom House (2003) are used that are intended to measure, respectively, commercial 
freedom, governmental propriety (lack of corruption), and the overall state of repression 
in a country.   
 
(iii) Factor quantities, typically being endogenous variables, are not the variables we 
want, but rather underlying causes of factor quantities, particularly of investment in 
capital or purchased inputs conveying new technology.    Prices of specific factors in each 
country’s agriculture vary across countries but they are likewise endogenous variables, 
consequences as much as causes of agricultural growth.  Product prices are often good 
candidates as causal variables especially for traded commodities (so we are essentially 
treating agricultural sector growth as a matter of estimating supply functions) but in the 
present analysis all variation in the observations is cross-sectional, so all countries are, to 
a first approximation, operating under the same set of changes in world market 
conditions.  Where countries differ in product and factor market is in the role of 
subsidies, trade barriers, or other governmental interventions, often stacked against 
agriculture as cited for example by Schultz (1978) and Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes 
(1991).  Unfortunately, while there have been major efforts to quantify the support 
provided to agriculture so as to permit cross-country comparisons among the OECD 
countries, we do not have such measures for most of the less-developed countries of the 
world.  I use estimates of a country’s producer subsidies as estimated by USDA (1994) 
for the countries USDA covered.
10 
                                                 
10 Product prices in all countries are affected by subsidies of agriculture in the OECD countries, and some 
countries because of their product mix or location are affected differently from others.  Adverse effects 
upon growth would appear most directly in a lower agricultural GDP, or slower growth of agricultural 
GDP, in the most vulnerable countries.  In order to obtain evidence on the importance of differential   11
 
(iv) New technology.  In searching for causes of the transformation of agriculture from 
economic stagnation to economic growth, one is naturally drawn to examine the 
experiences of countries where this has happened, that is, to the countries toward the top 
of the list in Table 2.  This draws one’s attention more to the industrial countries and less 
to the developing world.  The story agricultural economists are most familiar with is as 
follows: scientists, engineers, and tinkerers, in both the private and public sectors, apply 
their knowledge to problems of agriculture; extension services and other sources of 
information place new knowledge in farmers’ hands; and with sufficient property rights 
and price incentives to call forth the necessary investment, farmers adopt new technology 
and generate more output and income from their resources.  Most of the gains may accrue 
to buyers of farm products rather than their producers as increased output drives down 
prices, but nonetheless this is the paradigm of growth.   
 
However, how to specify variables suitable for equation (2) is not so clear, even at the 
level of what sorts of variables one needs.  Historians have unearthed evidence on what 
was going on during the period when U.S. agriculture entered upon its period of strong 
and sustained productivity growth.  This evidence, which has been largely neglected by 
economists, includes facts about farmers’ attitudes and preferences, the intellectual and 
exemplary contributions of visionary individuals, and the establishment of institutions 
and forms of economic organization conducive to growth.  The idea of the farmer as an 
ignorant, intellectually ossified follower of traditional practice and fearful of change, and 
constitutionally unable to forgo consumption in order to invest, was an influential view in 
the first half of the twentieth century.  In this context investment in new technology 
requires a cultural transformation.  Nonetheless, Griliches (1957) brilliantly showed that 
profitability was sufficient to explain the pattern of adoption of hybrid corn. But rural 
sociologists also staked claim to cultural/social explanations such as community 
leadership and informational networks (for example, Ryan and Gross, 1943; Havens and 
Rogers, 1961).  Danbom (1979) describes the efforts by many promoters of progress in 
agriculture, notably President Theodore Roosevelt in the first decades of the twentieth 
century, to instill in farm people a mentality conducive to commercialization of their 
enterprises, investment, and adoption of innovative technology.  Historians like Clarke 
(1994) have also given a broader interpretation to agricultural support programs, 
particularly the New Deal programs of the 1930s, emphasizing how the programs altered 
farmers’ outlook in ways that promoted investment and adoption of new technology. 
 
Broader modes of thought are of course not new in the theory of development. Hagen 
(1962) is exemplary of ideas in the 1950s that obstacles to development are largely 
                                                                                                                                                 
product price experiences on differences in the rates of agricultural GDP growth shown in Table 2, that 
table also shows the rate of growth of FAO’s crop production index, a quantity indicator.  The ranking of 
countries from high to low growth rates in 1980-2001 is quite similar for the two indicators, and not 
generally lower for agricultural GDP.  Because low or declining prices reduce agricultural GDP directly, 
while they affect crop output only indirectly through supply response, the similarity of the two columns 
suggests that differential world market price experience is a not a major factor in these rankings – though 
this hypothesis certainly could use better confirming or disconfirming evidence.  In the regressions my 
rough proxy for international trade effects is the share of GDP accounted for by trade in goods. 
   12
traditional rural village institutions and/or inside the heads of the villagers.  Thus, 
“economic theory has rather little to offer” and “both the barriers to growth and the 
causes of growth seem to be largely internal rather than external” (Hagen, quoted in 
Stevens and Jabara, 1988, p. 94).  This view is the opposite of Schultz’s mentioned 
earlier, that inputs from outside of agriculture are key, and that, if profitable, they will be 
adopted.
11  The non-economic approach lost luster with the perceived failure of 
community development schemes, and it seems the last nail in its coffin was the Green 
Revolution.  New varieties were adopted along with purchased inputs, apparently without 
need of cultural or psychological transformations in rural communities. 
 
In order to test these ideas in equation (2) we need both technological and cultural 
variables.  The data available on either type of variable for the countries of the Table 2 
data set have neither the conceptual specificity nor the precise measurement that one 
would like.  We do have data that arguably reflect differences in technology between 
countries.  Several studies, such as Evenson and Kislev (1975), use a country’s research 
and/or extension expenditures as a cause of agricultural growth (with long lags).  I use 
two of their indicators measured as of the mid-1960s, public research expenditures and 
agricultural science publications (Evenson and Kislev, Appendix I).  However, these data 
are not reported for 24 countries in the Table 2 sample.  The CGIAR publishes later data 
for more countries, of which I use average public research expenditures in each country 
during 1976-1980.  These data are used to estimate a research expenditure variable that 
covers 53 countries with information about spending in the 15 years preceding the 1980-
2001 period over which equation (2) is estimated.  Because identifying effects of new 
technology through these variables is far from assured, given the long lags found by most 
researchers between invention and implementation and the pervasive role of “spill-ins” 
from other countries’ research and from the CGIAR centers, indirect indicators of 
technology implementation are also used as X0 variables.  These are initial (1980) 
estimates of fertilizer per hectare and tractors per hectare.  In addition, I use the rate of 
growth of cereal yields over the two decades preceding 1980 to indicate pre-existing 
willingness to innovate that may carry over to the 1980-2001 period. 
 
On the cultural side, the most plausible personal characteristics are educational 
attainments.  The one for which we have the most widespread data is the extent of 
illiteracy in a country.  High illiteracy plausibly indicates a high prevalence of traditional 
attitudes that are barriers to growth.  However, illiteracy may also serve as a proxy for 
(lack of) schooling, and schooling is an indicator of investment in human capital and 
improved labor quality that Schultz pioneered as important in agricultural development, 
and which has been widely accepted by economists as a source of economic growth. 
 
A quite different labor-centered view of agriculture and economic growth stems from the 
observation of large numbers of poor and seemingly underemployed people in rural 
areas.  The stark labor-surplus ideas of early dual economy models have evolved to more 
                                                 
11 Evidence that standard opinion was closer to Hagen than to Schultz in the 1960s is the following from 
the Rockefeller Foundation on constraints to adoption of new crop varieties in Colombia: “The bottleneck 
is the training of farmers to appreciate the value of good seed and to use improved farm practices” 
(Rockefeller Foundation, 1963).   13
nuanced assessments that still retain the thought that the path to rural development must 
overcome in some way the insufficiency of remunerative employment where the ratio of 
workers to other resources is high.  Tomich, Kilby, and Johnson (1995), for example, 
characterize the economies where development is needed as CARLs (countries with 
abundant rural labor). I attempt to test for the difference made by labor abundance using 
rural population density (workers per hectare) as an explanatory variable.   
 
Cross-sectional Regression Results.  Table 3 reports the results of estimates of three 
specifications of equation (2) for the Table 2 set of countries.  The results are typical of 
cross-country regressions in being suggestive but far from definitive in sorting out causes 
of growth.  Regression 1, the simple convergence model, indicates significant divergence 
– in countries that started out with the highest agricultural GDP per worker in 1980, that 
variable grew the fastest between 1980 and 2001.  The included in Regressions 2 and 3 
include  growth conditioning variables intended to explain the sources of differences in 
growth rates.  They have jointly significant effects on the rate of agricultural GDP 
increase, and many have the expected signs, but none of them emerges individually as a 
predominant determinant of agricultural growth.   
 
Consider for example the illiteracy variable.  This is the variable most directly related to 
human capital and also to ideas about cultural prerequisites to growth.  The sign of this 
variable is not robust – it changes as other right-hand side variables are added or deleted 
– and the variable is not statistically significant (here and later taking significance at the 
10 percent level – requiring a “t” statistic of 1.7 or more in absolute value). This lack of 
significance is not a complete surprise as it parallels the findings in Craig, Pardey and 
Roseboom (1997) and Mundlak (1999), who also estimated no significant effects of 
literacy on productivity or agricultural GDP per worker.  However, Hayami and Ruttan 
(1985, Ch. 6) found education an important cause of productivity growth in agriculture 
(although their literacy variable alone was often insignificant).  So did Antle (1983) and 
Fulginiti and Perrin (1993).
12  One can say correctly that illiteracy data are quite 
imperfect both conceptually and practically as measures of human capital or skill, but that 
leaves us still with no clear answer about the importance of schooling to growth, and 
skepticism about the importance of the variable (whether one place a human capital or 
cultural interpretation upon it. 
 
The other variable related to labor supply is rural population density (persons per square 
kilometer) at the beginning of the period, 1980.  If abundant labor is a hindrance to 
growth, this variable should have a negative sign.  But the variable is insignificant in in 
regression 2 and positive in regression 3, and generally not robust in other specifications 
tried.
13  (Similarly inconclusive results were obtained for an alternative measure, 
agricultural workers per hectare of arable land.) 
 
                                                 
12 See Huffman (2001) for a thorough review of econometric studies. 
 
13 The positive sign in regression 3 is not totally unexpected following the arguments of Boserup (1975) 
that population growth in poor countries is not always the curse it is often taken to be.   14
Variables intended to indicate the initial presence of technological innovation had a 
mixed performance.  The coefficient of the 1980 level of fertilizer per hectare has a 
positive sign and statistically significant in regression 2, but the effect of tractors per 
hectare is 1980 are insignificant or negative.  Growth of crop output per worker in the 
preceding period, 1961-1980, is one of the few variables that consistently has a 
significantly positive sign, suggesting that countries with a history of productivity 
improvement have momentum that carries through to later growth.  However, the 
research variable is insignificant.  This result persists whether research spending is 
measured per dollar of agricultural GDP or as an absolute amount (the latter being 
appropriate if research is a pure public good within the country).  The alternative 
technology variable from Evenson and Kislev (1975), gives the same results. 
 
The variability of the inflation rate, an indicator of economic instability is thoroughly 
insignificant, but the four political variables tell a more interesting story.  The measures 
of restraints on economic freedom and civil liberties, as measured by the Heritage 
Foundation and Freedom House, respectively, and consistently negative and sometimes 
significant, and similarly the absence of corruption as scored by Transparency 
International.  Internal war sufficient to quality for Stewart et al.’s case studies reduce the 
rate of growth by 1.7 percent annually according to regression 2. 
 
Regression 3 adds two variables more explicitly related to a country’s economic policies, 
added in a separate regression because fewness of observations reduces the sample size 
considerably.  The first is the value of international trade in goods as a fraction of 
national GDP.  The second is an index of governmental support to agricultural 
commodity markets, the producer subsidy equivalent (PSE).  PSEs have been calculated 
in a number of ways, and all of those ways have been subject to criticism.  I use the 1985-
89 average PSE as estimated in U.S. Department of Agriculture (1994).  The importance 
of goods in international trade and the PSE, are both significantly positive, suggesting 
that a country can increase its growth of agricultural GDP per worker by trading more 
and by subsidizing its agriculture.  (The national welfare consequences may of course be 
quite different, notably because the PSE boosts agriculture at the cost of taxpayer 
outlays.)  Note that the coefficient means that the PSE would have to increase by 30 
percent of the value of agricultural output in order to boost the rates of agricultural GDP 
growth by 0.1 percent. 
 
Table 2 shows that the slowest-growing agricultures tend to be in African countries.  
However, adding dummy variables for Africa (and other regions) to regressions 2 and 3 
generates insignificant coefficients, suggesting that the growth-conditioning factors we 
have been analyzing account for the regional differences.  Note also that in regressions 2 
and 3, the initial (1980) value of the dependent variable tends to be negative, suggesting 
that conditional on the factors considered, convergence may be a fact.  Perhaps more 
important is the lack of evidence for divergence.  A plausible a priori case can be made 
for the hypotheses that rich countries with high agricultural GDP per worker invest more 
in agricultural research and this boosts subsequent growth in a way less available to 
poorer countries.  Regressions 2 and 3 argue against the applicability of this hypothesis. 
But recall the strictures above on possible bias in this estimated coefficient.    15
 
Real Household Income Growth 
 
Growth in the agricultural sector is important insofar as it helps achieve growth in real 
standards of living. But analysis of the relationship between agricultural sector growth 
and average rural incomes or rural poverty involves several complications to an already 
complicated set of issues.  Note first that the most easily demonstrable gains from 
productivity growth in agriculture are those of urban consumers of food products who 
benefit from lower prices.  This contribution of agriculture is an important benefit in a 
whole-economy view but for rural incomes low prices mean less market returns.  How 
can we identify the contribution of agricultural sector growth to rural household incomes? 
 
Consider two views about the causes of real income growth in rural areas: first, 
agriculture as the engine of growth, with investment in agriculture generating real income 
growth in rural areas; and second, economy-wide demand for labor as the engine of 
income growth, with rising real wages a sufficient condition for rural household income 
growth.  My reason for drawing this contrast is that in recent work on economic growth 
in American agriculture (Gardner 2002), I came more and more to see the second view as 
capturing the dominant forces behind the catch-up of farm to urban household incomes 
levels.  Putting aside the Depression, from the “Golden Age of Agriculture” in 1897-1914 
through the 1960s, U.S. agriculture was a technologically dynamic magnet for 
investment, and with high and sustained rates of productivity growth after the mid-1930s.  
Yet the median income of farm households remained low relative to nonfarm incomes.  
Incomes of farm families only rose above 60 percent of those of the nonfarm population 
during 1910-20.  The trend, if any, was negative until 1960.  Therefore, a vigorous 
agricultural sector is not a sufficient condition for high incomes or for real income growth 
in the rural sector (relative to the urban sector).  
 
Later U.S. history casts doubt on agricultural sector growth as a necessary condition for 
farm household income growth.  Although U.S. agricultural productivity (multifactor 
productivity as estimated by USDA) has continued to grow at about the same rate of 1 
1/2 to 2 percent annually for the whole 1948-1999 period, since 1980 investment in the 
sector has turned negative and real agricultural income per farm declined.  Yet this is the 
very period in which farm household incomes at last caught up to nonfarm household 
incomes, and indeed by the end of the 20
th century were well ahead (see Gardner, 2002, 
pp. 78 and 84).  Therefore, a vigorous agricultural sector is not necessary for high 
household incomes or income growth in the rural sector.
14 
 
Even if agricultural growth is neither necessary nor sufficient for household income 
growth, it could nonetheless be helpful.  But in cross-sectional analyses of U.S. states and 
counties I found no significant relationship between sectoral growth and rural household 
income growth, neither at the median income level nor for relatively low income groups 
nor for the incidence of farm poverty (Gardner 2000).  Instead, what matters is the 
                                                 
14 To put the point more concretely, I believe that if for example the mechanical cotton picker had never 
been invented, U.S. cotton laborers would not have appreciably higher incomes today.  But there would be 
a lot more of them (assuming the U.S. remained competitive in world markets).        16
linkage of farm factor markets, particular the farm labor market, with the nonfarm 
economy. 
 
Notwithstanding the preceding, it would be premature to dismiss the agricultural sector 
growth as an engine of rural household income growth in developing countries, or indeed 
to dismiss the role of agriculture in nationwide economic growth, for reasons that have 
been continually emphasized in the literature on agriculture and development at least 
since Johnston and Mellor (1961).  The most basic is macroeconomic, in countries where 
agriculture’s share of the labor force is large.  An increase in real output per worker 
resulting from agricultural productivity growth increases labor productivity in the whole 
economy, and hence increases real income per capita. This is the point at which the oft-
repeated statistics about a near majority of the developing world’s labor force being rural 
becomes relevant to agriculture as an engine of growth.  Similarly, if agriculture 
generates a large fraction of a country’s consumption or of export-earning goods, then 
improved productivity in agriculture directly increases real GDP per capita substantially.  
If a public investment of $1 billion in a sector of the economy generates an increase in 
total factor productivity of 2 percent over the next twenty years in that sector, it is best, 
other things equal, to carry out the investment in the largest sector available.   
 
These considerations suggest that agriculture, as an analytical component in the theory of 
economic growth, has a lot going for it.  It is therefore striking that in the general 
economic literature on growth, agricultural growth is not taken as fundamental.  We have 
impressive recent work emphasizing ideas and growth (Jones 2003), human capital and 
growth, geography and growth, and incentives and growth, but agriculture has no 
distinctive role in any of them.  Easterly (2001) is a good example of a wide-ranging and 
sensible discussion of the current state of knowledge in which the role of agriculture is 
negligible.  Do data from developing economies impel one to think otherwise? 
 
Figure 3 shows the relationship between growth of agricultural GDP per worker and 
national GDP per capita for 52 developing countries during 1980-2001.  The association 
is positive and significant.  But what is the direction of causality, if any (since both could 
be generated by a common underlying set of causes)?  Investigation of lags in our sample 
of countries during 1961-2001 does not show agriculture as leading.   
 
The prime experience in the developing world that impels one to consider the possibility 
of agriculture as an engine of rural income growth is East Asia.  This is where both 
agricultural GDP and overall GDP per capita have generated the most positive long-term 
record.
 15  The World Bank (2002) concludes that in these countries “agricultural 
development created a dynamism in rural areas, which, in later stages, was combined 
with rapid industrialization” (p. 47).  The data evidence for this conclusion is not spelled 
out or cited, however.  Both agricultural and overall GDP growth for South Korea, the 
outstanding example of rapid and sustained agricultural GDP growth in our sample, are 
                                                 
15 One might also consider Botswana, which President’s Bush’s July 2003 visit gave the Washington Post 
occasion to call “the fastest-growing developing country in the world” (July 7, 2003, p. A16).  Indeed, it is 
so for the 1980-2002 period among the countries covered in Table 4.  But is there an agricultural 
component to this story? No.   17
shown in Figure 4.   No strong message about causality is apparent in that chart.  National 
GDP per capita grew faster than agricultural GDP per worker throughout the 1961-2001 
period, the latter at the high rate of 4.7 percent annually and the former at the 
extraordinary rate of 6.1 percent over the four decades, increasing from $1,350 per capita 
(in 1995 dollars) in 1961 to $13,500 in 2001.  Agricultural GDP grew at a faster rate after 
1980 than before, suggesting that national GDP led agricultural growth rather than the 
Bank’s asserted causality.  Moreover, with a PSE of 58 percent of commodity value for 
its nine top products during 1985-90, South Korea has one of the most highly subsidized 
agricultures in our sample.  Tsay (2002) ties the growth of agricultural sectors in Taiwan 
and Japan as well as South Korea to commodity support policies.   
 
Indonesia is a case where agriculture has been specifically identified as contributing 
fundamentally to growth.  Timmer (1998) notes that during 1969 to 1994, “agriculture 
provided more than 40 percent of the new jobs for a rapidly expanding labor force,” and 
that “Aggressive investments in agricultural development paid Indonesia high dividends 
in economic growth, reduced poverty, and increased rice production” (p. 546).   Yet 
Figure 5 shows no evident leading relationship between agricultural GDP and national 
GDP, and direction of causality is unclear from the data.  Nonetheless, Timmer marshals 
factual details that are convincing on an important contribution from agriculture. 
 
Table 4 shows the growth rates of agricultural GDP per worker and national GDP per 
capita for 66 countries.  Within each of the regional developing country groupings 
(Africa, Asia and Latin America), the countries that grew fastest in national GDP per 
capita also grew fastest in agricultural GDP per worker, with a few notable exceptions 
such as Brazil.  But in the region where the fastest growth occurred, Asia, agricultural 
growth lagged behind national growth; while in Africa and Latin America agricultural 
growth was higher.
16   
 
Regressions like those of Table 3 were estimated with the growth of national GDP per 
capita as the dependent variable.  In these regressions (not shown in detail)  
the estimated β coefficient is significantly negative, indicating that the lower-income 
countries in 1980 grew faster during 1980-2001.  Factors causing faster growth in 
agricultural GDP have positive effects on national GDP growth.  The political and 
economic institutional variables are significant, as is the corruption index.  Because of its 
prominence in recent literature I also tested the hypothesis that in these data countries 
with access to international waters (oceans or seas connected to them) grow faster than 
land-locked ones.  Indeed, in this sample the “coastal” countries (75 percent of the 
sample) did grow significantly faster during 1980-2001, others things held constant.  
And, consistently with that finding, greater participation in international trade in the 
initial period (1980) is significantly related to faster GDP growth in 1980-2001. 
 
                                                 
16 Note that these comparisons do not say anything about agriculture’s share of national GDP, which turns 
on aggregate values.  These growth rates are per person, so if the rural population is declining it is quite 
possible for agricultural GDP per person to rise while aggregate agricultural GDP, and its share in total 
GDP, are declining.   18
However, these results say nothing about rural as compared to urban incomes, as rural-
urban income differences are not in the data set.  One study that carried out an 
econometric investigation of specifically rural incomes in a developing country context is 
Estudillo, Quisumbing, and Otsuka (2000), on wage rates of agricultural workers in the 
Philippines.  Their findings parallel those cited above for the United States – the cause of 
growth in agricultural wage rates is growth of labor demand in the nonfarm economy.
17  
Vink (2001) cites research that indicates off-farm sources of household income 




The chief candidates for causes of growth in agricultural value-added (GDP) and rural 
household income growth are: (i) providing macroeconomic and political stability; (ii) 
institutions establishing property rights and incentives; (iii) access to competitive input 
markets and remunerative output markets; and (iv) adoption of productivity-enhancing 
technology. For purposes of real household income growth, a fifth element appears 
crucial, namely (v) real income growth in the non-agricultural economy 
 
Good arguments have been made for all of these factors being important, but the cross-
country empirical evidence on their role is mixed.  The Green Revolution showed that, on 
the one hand, success can be achieved even without fundamental reforms in (i), (ii), (iii), 
and (v); but, on the other hand, transforming those gains into permanent increases in rural 
living standards has proven elusive.   
 
Observations of sustained past real income growth in developing countries are almost by 
definition observations of countries which are no longer poor.   Almost universally in 
such cases, all five factors are substantially present.
18  But in all such countries 
agriculture as a share of national GDP has fallen substantially.  Even in the fast-growing 
East Asian countries where agriculture has expanded, this appears to be as much due to 
government subsidies as to growth dynamics generated by technological change or other 
productivity improvements within agriculture. 
 
                                                 
17 The implications of agricultural GDP growth for rural poverty are even more complicated to analyze, 
and I have no data to offer.  The preponderance of evidence appears to support the conclusion that 
agricultural productivity growth is poverty reducing (see Hazzell and Haddad, 2001, IFAD, 2001).  But for 
the U.S. at least, I found real income growth in the nonfarm sector to be more fundamentally important in 
increasing low farm incomes than any specifically agricultural variable (Gardner 2000).  Timmer (2001) 
reports similar but more nuanced findings for a sample of developing countries in terms of linkage between 
nationwide per capita income and incomes in the lowest quintile (not the lowest quintile of rural incomes 
but the nationwide lowest quintile of income in countries with relatively large rural populations).  Ravallion 
and Dutt (2002), find that both farm yields and nonfarm income growth reduce poverty, but that the 
elasticity of poverty measures with respect to nonfarm income varies substantially across the states of India 
that constitute the sample data for their work.  This literature is more about the anatomy of poverty 
reduction as related to GDP growth than about the causes of either. 
 
18 “Almost” in both preceding sentences because if a country starts with a low enough income level, even 
growth sustained for two or three decades might not make the country rich.  Consider China for example.   19
In the context of overall real income growth in a country, it is important to distinguish 
between agricultural GDP in aggregate and agricultural GDP per worker.  We may hope 
that with appropriate institutions and policies GDP per worker may increase in all 
countries.  But one would not expect or hope to see the size of agriculture as a sector 
(aggregate agricultural GDP) increase in all countries.  Because of location-specific 
changes in technology or changes in relative factor prices because of different countries’ 
factor endowments, some countries are expected to gain but others to lose comparative 
advantage in agriculture under economic growth.  So we should not automatically 
identify success in growth with increasing agricultural GDP (or output).  Still, increasing 
productivity or agricultural GDP per worker is generally an indicator of success, in the 
sense of providing the material basis for an improved standard of living for both rural and 
urban residents.  That is why this paper focuses on GDP per worker rather than aggregate 
GDP or agricultural output. 
 
Even when agricultural productivity grows, it is apparent that rural household incomes 
may not grow, as the earlier discussion of the United States indicated.  It appears likely 
that a similar lesson will emerge from the East Asian countries where rural household 
incomes are growing: what is necessary is real average income growth in the economy as 
a whole, and that may be sufficient for rural income growth even if agriculture shrinks.  
In this context, some of the factors that did not show well in the cross-country regressions 
explaining agricultural GDP per worker may nonetheless be important causes of rural 
workers’ income growth.  It is well attested that education, to take the prime example, is 
valuable in increasing workers’ earnings.  But this value is not nearly so evident in farm 
production.   
 
Although the arguments and evidence have hardly been touched upon here, it seems 
likely that the preceding conclusion applies also to rural poverty.  To remedy rural 
poverty, what is most needed are improvements in the labor market more than, say, 
improved crop varieties.  This is not to say that agricultural research, rural infrastructure 
investment, or the development of agricultural export sectors are not valuable or that their 
net effect on poverty is not in the right direction.  The literature cited earlier suggests 
otherwise. Agricultural research and rural education and infrastructure development 
efforts have been highly profitable investments with a regularity that defies most 
commercial innovations.
 19 But what I am coming to believe is that in response to general 
economists’ earlier neglect of agriculture, we have over-corrected. To put the issue in the 
policy recommendation context, we should evaluate policy or projects aimed at rural 
development first and foremost using benefit-cost analysis, with the most comprehensive 
accounting possible.  This criterion will support many agricultural investments.  But 
some of the highest-payoff agricultural investments may benefit farmers less than 
nonfarm people; and the policies that benefit rural people most may well not be 
agricultural.
20 
                                                 
19 For a recent comprehensive review of CGIAR research, see World Bank (2003). 
20 Evolution in how the agricultural sector is treated in the World Bank illustrates problems that can arise in 
this context.  An agricultural unit within the Bank once made sense because of loans that had a central 
focus on agricultural production, so one needed technical experts in these matters.  But as the Bank came to 
focus more on broader structural and policy matters in client countries, and on poverty reduction as a goal,   20
 
In closing, I have to say that I am uneasy about the preceding conclusions.  What they 
mostly rest upon is a failure to find sufficiently strong associations between variables 
representing hypothesized causal factors in agricultural GDP growth and differences 
across countries in actual growth rates of agricultural GDP per worker.  But many of the 
variables are crude proxies for the variables we would really like to have, and for these 
proxies measurement errors are likely.  So the conclusions are even more than usually 
tentative.  I am continuing these investigations together with Isabelle Tsakok and would 
be happy to eat what I have written here if further data and analysis change the story.  
                                                                                                                                                 
to be useful an agricultural unit had to broaden greatly to become a rural development unit and to 
incorporate expertise in all manner of socio-economic issues.  But when this is done, as exemplified in the 
Bank’s recent rural strategy document (World Bank, 2002), it is not clear why the most appropriate policies 
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Table 1. Trend Rates of Growth in Cereal Yields       
          
  1961-80  1981-2001  Lower in 81-01?   
AFRICA  (Sub-Saharan)       
Swaziland 0.075  0.014  y     
Liberia 0.049  -0.002  y     
Zambia 0.041  -0.013  y     
Mauritius 0.036  0.023  y     
South Africa  0.033  0.023  y     
Uganda 0.027  0.006  y     
Zimbabwe 0.026  -0.002  y     
Benin 0.023  0.027  n     
Nigeria 0.019  -0.012  y     
Tanzania 0.017  0.002  y     
Malawi 0.013  0.013  n     
Burkina Faso  0.009  0.025  n     
Burundi 0.009  0.011  n     
Sierra Leone  0.008  -0.010  y     
Kenya 0.008  -0.006  y     
Senegal 0.008  0.006  y     
Cameroon 0.006  0.028  n     
Mali 0.005  0.013  n     
Cote d'Ivoire  0.004  0.023  n     
Gambia, The  0.001  -0.006  y     
Gabon 0.001  -0.002  y     
Madagascar -0.001  0.006  n     
Ghana -0.001  0.034  n     
Rwanda -0.005  -0.011  y     
Guinea -0.006  0.024  n     
Botswana -0.007  -0.017  y     
Chad -0.012  -0.003  n     
Sudan -0.015  0.001  n     
Angola -0.019  0.015  n     
Mozambique -0.020  0.033  n     
Congo, Rep.  -0.021  0.003  n     
    Simple Average  0.010  0.008 
16 y, 15 
n    
          
ASIA          
China 0.041  0.020  y     
Pakistan 0.037  0.019  y     
Indonesia 0.035  0.011  y     
Korea, Rep.  0.032  0.009  y     
Philippines 0.024  0.022  y     
India 0.022  0.027  n     
Malaysia 0.019  0.010  y     
Bangladesh 0.009  0.025  n     
Sri Lanka  0.009  0.009  n     
Thailand 0.003  0.016  n       27
Cambodia -0.005  0.029  n     
    Simple Average  0.021  0.018  6 y, 5n     
          
Latin America           
Belize 0.063  0.007  y     
Colombia 0.041  0.012  y     
Guatemala 0.039  0.002  y     
Costa Rica  0.037  0.038  n     
Mexico 0.031  0.011  y     
Ecuador 0.031  0.013  y     
Uruguay 0.030  0.040  n     
Venezuela, RB  0.029  0.032  n     
Argentina 0.023  0.021  y     
Suriname 0.020  -0.003  y     
Guyana 0.015  0.016  n     
Peru 0.014  0.016  n     
Chile 0.012  0.039  n     
Bolivia 0.011  0.014  n     
Paraguay 0.009  0.018  n     
Brazil 0.002  0.032  n     
Haiti -0.004  -0.007  y     
Honduras -0.006  -0.001  n     
    Simple Average  0.022  0.017 
8 y, 10 
n    
          
OECD          
Greece 0.042  0.003  y     
Spain 0.034  0.021  y     
Austria 0.032  0.010  y     
France 0.031  0.019  y     
Finland 0.029  0.010  y     
Italy 0.028  0.019  y     
Canada 0.024  0.013  y     
United States  0.023  0.018  y     
Norway 0.022  0.005  y     
Japan 0.017  0.006  n     
Portugal 0.016  0.046  n     
New Zealand  0.015  0.020  n     
Sweden 0.015  0.010  y     
Australia 0.007  0.024  n     
Denmark 0.004  0.018  n     
    Simple Average  0.023  0.016 
10 y, 5 
n    
          
OTHER          
Albania 0.060  -0.006  y     
Hungary 0.049  -0.011  y     
Romania 0.039  -0.010  y     
Bulgaria 0.039  -0.028  y     
Turkey 0.029  0.007  y     
Poland 0.025  0.002  y       28
Morocco 0.016  -0.011  y     
Egypt, Arab Rep.  0.013  0.030  n     
Tunisia 0.008  0.021  n     
Vietnam 0.004  0.030  n     
Mongolia 0.003  -0.028  y     
    Simple Average  0.026  0.000  8 y, 3 n     
          
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, on-line tables released June 
2003. 
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Table 2.  Trend Rates of Growth     
  Ag GDP   Crop Production 
  per Worker  per Worker 
 1980-2001  1980-2000 
    
Korea, Rep.  0.066  0.063 
Spain 0.058  0.050 
Denmark 0.054  0.046 
France 0.054  0.049 
Bulgaria 0.052  0.029 
Austria 0.052  0.028 
Canada 0.051  0.063 
Romania 0.050  0.025 
Italy 0.045  0.034 
Brazil 0.042  0.039 
United States  0.041  0.027 
Finland 0.039  0.046 
Norway 0.037  0.011 
Benin 0.036  0.048 
Portugal 0.036  0.034 
Guyana 0.035  0.025 
China 0.034  0.029 
Belize 0.034  0.027 
Nigeria 0.033  0.055 
Sweden 0.032  0.028 
Chile 0.031  0.021 
Tunisia 0.031  0.019 
Mauritius 0.030  0.030 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  0.030  0.036 
Costa Rica  0.029  0.030 
Pakistan 0.029  0.021 
Japan 0.028  0.032 
New Zealand  0.028  0.027 
Malaysia 0.027  0.033 
Australia 0.024  0.046 
Greece 0.023  0.033 
Ecuador 0.023  0.021 
Honduras 0.022  0.005 
Vietnam 0.021  0.027 
Argentina 0.020  0.034 
Thailand 0.020  0.010 
India 0.019  0.019 
Mozambique 0.019  -0.009 
Chad 0.019  0.016 
Peru 0.018  0.027 
Uruguay 0.018  0.028 
South Africa  0.017  0.014 
Morocco 0.017  0.016 
Venezuela, RB  0.016  0.021   30
Mali 0.016  0.019 
Burkina Faso  0.016  0.022 
Bangladesh 0.015  0.012 
Guinea 0.015  0.006 
Malawi 0.014  0.004 
Paraguay 0.013  0.014 
Cameroon 0.013  0.005 
Hungary 0.013  0.014 
Mongolia 0.012  -0.018 
Indonesia 0.012  0.013 
Uganda 0.010  0.011 
Zimbabwe 0.009  0.007 
Mexico 0.009  0.012 
Colombia 0.008  0.013 
Congo, Rep.  0.008  0.009 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.005  0.017 
Botswana 0.005  -0.015 
Sri Lanka  0.004  -0.006 
Swaziland 0.003  0.000 
Zambia 0.003  -0.002 
Guatemala 0.003  0.000 
Gabon 0.003  0.028 
Philippines 0.002  0.003 
Suriname 0.002  -0.023 
Turkey 0.001  0.009 
Madagascar 0.000  -0.014 
Senegal -0.001  0.020 
Rwanda -0.003  -0.007 
Ghana -0.004  0.021 
Burundi -0.010  -0.012 
Kenya -0.012  -0.011 
Gambia, The  -0.015  0.008 
Sierra Leone  -0.046  -0.014 
    
Note: Ag GDP endpoints are 1984 and 2000 in a few countries because of data 
limitations. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2003 
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Table 3.  Cross-Country Regressions Explaining Growth in Agricultural GDP per 
Worker, 1980-2001 
Independent Variable  Dependent Variable: Trend rate of growth of Ag GDP per worker 
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.309 .426  .532  .714 
Number of countries  71  71  49  27   32
 
 
Table 4. Real Annual Growth Rates, 1980-2001   
      
  Ag GDP  National GDP  GDP - Ag GDP 
 per  Worker  per  Capita   
AFRICA      
Botswana 0.005  0.044  0.039 
Swaziland 0.003  0.021  0.018 
Burkina Faso  0.016  0.014  -0.001 
Ghana -0.004  0.009  0.014 
Chad 0.019  0.009  -0.010 
Malawi 0.014  0.005  -0.009 
Benin 0.036  0.003  -0.033 
Senegal -0.001  0.002  0.003 
Mali 0.016  0.001  -0.015 
Nigeria 0.033  0.001  -0.032 
Kenya -0.012  0.001  0.013 
Zimbabwe 0.009  0.000  -0.009 
Gambia, The  -0.015  -0.003  0.012 
South Africa  0.017  -0.008  -0.026 
Congo, Rep.  0.008  -0.013  -0.021 
Madagascar 0.000  -0.013  -0.013 
Burundi -0.010  -0.016  -0.006 
Cote d'Ivoire  0.005  -0.016  -0.022 
Cameroon 0.013  -0.020  -0.033 
Zambia 0.003  -0.021  -0.024 
Rwanda -0.003  -0.023  -0.020 
Sierra Leone  -0.046  -0.046  0.001 
MEAN 0.005  -0.003  -0.008 
      
ASIA      
Bangladesh 0.015  0.023  0.008 
China 0.034  0.082  0.047 
India 0.019  0.036  0.016 
Indonesia 0.012  0.040  0.029 
Korea, Rep.  0.066  0.062  -0.005 
Malaysia 0.027  0.040  0.013 
Pakistan 0.029  0.023  -0.005 
Philippines 0.002  0.001  -0.002 
Sri Lanka  0.004  0.033  0.029 
Thailand 0.020  0.054  0.034 
MEAN 0.023  0.039  0.016 
      
Latin American       
Argentina 0.020  0.008  -0.012 
Belize 0.034  0.028  -0.006 
Brazil 0.042  0.007  -0.034 
Chile 0.031  0.045  0.013 
Colombia 0.008  0.014  0.006   33
Costa Rica  0.029  0.018  -0.012 
Ecuador 0.023  0.000  -0.023 
Guatemala 0.003  0.003  0.000 
Guyana 0.035  0.016  -0.019 
Honduras 0.022  0.001  -0.021 
Mexico 0.009  0.006  -0.003 
Paraguay 0.013  -0.002  -0.015 
Peru 0.018  -0.006  -0.023 
Suriname 0.002  0.007  0.005 
Uruguay 0.018  0.017  0.000 
Venezuela, RB  0.016  -0.004  -0.020 
MEAN 0.020  0.010  -0.010 
      
OTHER      
Egypt, Arab Rep.  0.030  0.022  -0.007 
Morocco 0.017  0.012  -0.004 
Tunisia 0.031  0.021  -0.010 
Turkey 0.001  0.023  0.022 
MEAN 0.020  0.020  0.000 
      
OECD      
Australia 0.024  0.020  -0.004 
Austria 0.052  0.020  -0.032 
Canada 0.051  0.015  -0.036 
Denmark 0.054  0.017  -0.038 
Finland 0.039  0.018  -0.022 
France 0.054  0.016  -0.038 
Greece 0.023  0.012  -0.012 
Italy 0.045  0.018  -0.027 
Japan 0.028  0.024  -0.004 
Norway 0.037  0.025  -0.012 
Portugal 0.036  0.031  -0.005 
Spain 0.058  0.025  -0.033 
Sweden 0.032  0.014  -0.018 
United States  0.041  0.020  -0.021 
MEAN 0.041  0.020  -0.021 
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Figure 3.  Ag GDP per Worker and National GDP per Capita, 52 Developing Countries
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